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ABSTRACT	  Since	  September	  2011,	  the	  Eurasian	  gas	  market	  has	  been	  facing	  shocking	  bi-­‐
monthly	   announcements:	   on	   September	   23,	   British	   Petroleum	   (BP)	   announced	   the	   South	  
East	  Europe	  Pipeline	  (SEEP);	  on	  December	  26,	  Turkish	  and	  Azeri	  authorities	  announced	  their	  
joint	   agreement	   for	   the	   Trans-­‐Anatolian	   Pipeline	   (TANAP);	   and	   on	   February	   26,	   the	   Shah	  
Deniz	   II	   Consortium	   announced	   it	   was	   undertaking	   exclusive	   negotiations	   with	   the	   Trans	  
Adriatic	  Pipeline	  (TAP).	  The	  shock	  wave	  intensified	  when	  the	  Turkish	  Energy	  Minister	  hinted	  
that	  a	  new	  agreement	  allowing	  Russia	  to	  build	  its	  own	  South	  Stream	  pipeline	  under	  the	  Black	  
Sea	   using	   Turkish	   territorial	   waters	   was	   in	   the	   works.	   Now	   the	   ultimate	   question	   of	   the	  
Eurasian	  energy	  market	  is:	  “Which	  of	  these	  projects	  will	  be	  built?”	  This	  Policy	  Brief	  seeks	  to	  
answer	   this	   question	   by	   analyzing	   Turkey’s	   standing	   in	   Eurasian	   energy	   diplomacy	   in	   the	  
perspective	  of	  energy	  transit	  projects	  competing	  for	  building	  the	  Southern	  Energy	  Corridor	  
of	   gas	   transit	   from	   the	   Caspian	   zone	   to	   Europe.	   First,	   I	   present	   a	   short	   review	   of	   Turkish	  
strategy	   in	  Eurasian	  energy	  diplomacy.	   	  Secondly,	   I	  detail	   the	  driving	  forces	  behind	  Turkish	  
energy	   policy.	   I	   then	   conclude	   with	   some	   remarks	   about	   different	   scenarios	   of	   Turkish	  
energy	  policy	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  Southern	  Energy	  Corridor.	  	  
	  
Turkey’s	   Standing	   in	   Eurasian	  
Energy	  Diplomacy	  
Becoming	   a	   “bridge”	   between	   the	   East	  
and	   the	   West	   is	   the	   central	   concept	   of	  
Turkey’s	   new	   foreign	   policy,	   and	   this	   is	  
also	   echoed	   throughout	   Turkish	   energy	  
policy.	   In	  addition,	  with	   the	   revival	  of	   the	  
southern	   wing	   of	   the	   east-­‐west	   energy	  
axes,	   the	   quest	   for	   dominance	   in	   east-­‐
west	   energy	   transit	   roads	   is	   high	   on	  
Turkey’s	  agenda.	  	  	  
The	  southern	  wing	  of	  the	  east-­‐west	  energy	  
axes	   is	   a	   project	   of	   building	   a	   corridor	  
running	   from	   the	   Caspian	   Zone	   and	   the	  
Middle	   East	   to	   Europe	   via	   Turkey.	  
Discussions	   of	   these	   energy	   corridors	  
began	  after	  the	  Russia-­‐Ukraine	  gas	  crisis	  of	  
2006.	   The	   EU	  member	   countries	   affected	  
by	   this	   crisis	   reconsidered	   their	   establi-­‐
shed	   energy	   supply	   roads.	   Their	   depen-­‐
dency	   on	   northern	   gas	   routes	   dominated	  
by	  Russia	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  an	  energy	  
security	   vulnerability.	   Since	   then,	   the	   EU	  
has	   begun	   backing	   a	   series	   of	   strategies	  



























for	  the	  security	  of	  energy	  supply;	  ITGI,	  TAP	  
and	  Nabucco.	  Russia	  responded	  by	  promo-­‐
ting	  two	  different	  projects;	  Blue	  Stream	  II	  
and	   South	   Stream.	   And	   very	   recently	   BP	  
and	   SOCAR,	   as	   suppliers,	   changed	   the	  
game	  by	  pushing	  their	  own	  projects:	  SEEP	  
and	  TANAP.	  
EU-­‐backed	  Gas	  Pipeline	  Projects	  
Since	   2006,	   with	   the	   support	   of	   the	   EU	  
European	   energy	   companies	   developed	  
three	   main	   gas	   transit	   projects:	   the	  
Nabucco,	   ITGI	   and	   TAP	   pipeline	   projects.	  
These	   three	   pipeline	   projects	   constitute	  
alternatives	   for	   the	   Southern	   Energy	  
Corridor	   project	   backed	   by	   the	   EU,	   and	  
each	   appears	   to	   present	   an	   opportunity	  
for	  Turkey	  to	  fulfill	   its	  ambition	  of	  being	  a	  
powerful	   player	   in	   new	   energy	   routes	   of	  
Eurasia.	   Furthermore,	   becoming	   a	   major	  
energy	   transit	   country	   could	   also	   help	  
Turkey	  to	  fulfill	  its	  desire	  for	  EU	  accession.	  
Turkish	   public	   energy	   companies	   have	   al-­‐
ready	  been	  involved	  in	  gas	  transit	  pipeline	  
projects	   supported	   by	   the	   EU,	   and	   the	  
Turkish	   Parliament	   has	   already	   ratified	  
partnership	   agreements	   of	   the	   Nabucco	  
pipeline	  project.	  
The	  Nabucco	  project	  represents	  a	  new	  gas	  
pipeline	   connecting	   the	   Caspian	   region	  
and	  the	  Middle	  East	   (via	  Turkey,	  Bulgaria,	  
Romania	   and	   Hungary)	   with	   Austria	   and	  
further	   on	   to	   the	   Central	   and	   Western	  
European	   gas	   markets.	   The	   pipeline	   has	  
been	   designed	   to	   transport	   a	   maximum	  
amount	   of	   31	   bcm	   per	   year.	   Estimated	  
investment	   costs	   including	   finance	   costs	  
amount	  to	  approximately	  ten	  billion	  Euro.	  
OMV	   (Austria),	   MOL	   (Hungary),	   Transgaz	  
(Romania),	  BEH	  (Bulgaria),	  BOTAŞ	  (Turkey)	  
and	  RWE	   (Germany)	  are	   the	  shareholders	  
in	  the	  Nabucco	  Gas	  Pipeline,	  each	  holding	  
an	   equal	   share	   of	   16.67%	   in	   the	   project.	  
The	   company	   estimates	   that	   50%	   of	   the	  
pipeline	   capacity	   will	   be	   reserved	   for	  
shareholders,	   with	   the	   remaining	   50%	  
available	   to	   other	   gas	   shippers	   on	  
commercial	  terms	  that	  will	  later	  be	  agreed	  
upon.	  At	  the	  moment,	  construction	  of	  the	  
Nabucco	  pipeline	   remains	   suspended	  due	  
to	  a	  lack	  of	  relational	  strategy	  with	  supply	  
countries	  of	  the	  Caspian	  zone.	  
The	   ITGI,	   or	   “the	   Interconnection	   Turkey	  
Greece	   Italy,”	   gas	   pipeline	   project	   of	  
Greek	   DEPA	   and	   Italian	   Edison	   S.p.A	  
comprises	  four	  pipeline	  sections:	  
1. the	   Turkish	   grid,	   which	   will	   be	   upgra-­‐
ded	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  the	  transit	  of	  gas	  
volumes	  for	  Italy	  and	  Greece;	  
2. ITG	   (Interconnector	   Turkey-­‐Greece),	  
which	  has	  been	   in	  operation	   since	  No-­‐
vember	  2007	  and	  has	  a	  transport	  capa-­‐
city	   of	   about	   11.5	   bcm	   of	   natural	   gas	  
per	  year;	  
3. the	   IGI	   (Interconnector	   Greece-­‐Italy)	  
project	   with	   a	   transport	   capacity	   of	  
about	   9	   bcm	   of	   natural	   gas	   per	   year;	  
and	  
4. IGI	   Poseidon,	   a	   200	   kilometer-­‐long	  
offshore	  pipeline	  across	  the	  Ionian	  Sea.	  
The	   EU	   financed	   50%	   of	   the	   cost	   of	  
technical	   studies	   and	   29%	   of	   the	  
construction	  costs	  of	  the	  ITGI	  project.	  
TAP,	  a	  natural	  gas	  pipeline	  project	  running	  
from	   Greece	   to	   Albania,	   was	   offshore	  
(under	   the	   sea)	   in	   the	   Adriatic	   Sea	   and	  
then	   came	   onshore	   (on	   the	   ground)	   in	  
southern	   Italy.	   TAP	   will	   initially	   have	   a	  
capacity	   of	   10	   bcm,	   which	   could	   be	  
expanded	   to	   20	   bcm	   per	   year.	   TAP’s	  
shareholder	   structure	   includes	   	   Swiss	   EGL	  
(42.5%),	   Norwegian	   Statoil	   (42.5%)	   and	  
German	   E.ON	  Ruhrgas	   (15%).	   Finally,	   TAP	  
is	   recognized	   as	   a	   "Project	   of	   Common	  
Interest"	  by	  the	  EU	  Parliament	  and	  Council	  
under	   the	   European	   Union's	   Trans-­‐
European	   Energy	   Network,	   and	   it	   has	  
already	   received	   two	  grants	   for	   feasibility	  
studies	  from	  the	  trans-­‐European	  transport	  
budget.	  	  
These	   three	   pipeline	   projects	   (Nabucco,	  
TAP	   and	   ITGI)	   constitute	   the	   Southern	  



























Energy	  Corridor	  project	  backed	  by	  the	  EU,	  
and	  each	   appears	   to	  present	   an	  opportu-­‐
nity	   for	   Turkey	   to	   fulfill	   its	   ambition	   of	  
being	   a	   powerful	   player	   in	   new	   energy	  
routes	  of	  Eurasia.	  Furthermore,	  becoming	  
a	  major	   energy	   transit	   country	   could	   also	  
help	   Turkey	   to	   fulfill	   its	   desire	   for	   EU	  
accession.	   Turkish	   public	   energy	   compa-­‐
nies	   have	   already	   been	   involved	   in	   gas	  
transit	  pipeline	  projects	   supported	  by	   the	  
EU,	   and	   the	   Turkish	   Parliament	   has	  
already	  ratified	  partnership	  agreements	  of	  
the	  Nabucco	  pipeline	  project.	  
Beside	  the	  fact	  that	  three	  of	  these	  projects	  
offers	   an	   opportunity	   for	   Turkey	   to	   fulfill	  
its	  ambition	  of	  being	  a	  powerful	  player	   in	  
new	   energy	   routes	   of	  
Eurasia	  as	  well	  as	   stren-­‐
gthhening	  relations	  with	  
the	  EU,	  Turkey	  does	  not	  
dedicate	   all	   its	   state	  
capabilities	   exclusively	  
to	   the	   EU	   backed-­‐gas	  
pipeline	  projects.	  In	  fact,	  
Nabucco,	   TAP	   or	   ITGI	  
projects	   are	   not	   Tur-­‐
key’s	  only	  options	  to	  ful-­‐
fill	  its	  ambitions	  to	  beco-­‐
me	   an	   energy	   bridge:	   the	   Game	   also	   has	  
other	  players.	  First	  among	  these	  is	  Russia,	  
who	   supports	   South	   Stream	   and	   Blue	  
Stream	   II	   pipeline	   projects	   in	   response	   to	  
pipeline	   projects	   backed	   by	   the	   EU.	  
Turkish	   state	   and	   energy	   companies	   are	  
also	   involved	   in	   Russian	   pipeline	   projects	  
considered	   as	   competitors	   to	   the	   EU	  
pipeline	  projects.	  
Gas	  pipeline	  projects	  of	  Russia	  
In	   2000,	   when	   Putin	   came	   to	   power,	   he	  
initiated	  a	  campaign	  directed	  at	  expanding	  
state	  control	  in	  oil	  and	  gas.	  In	  this	  sector	  in	  
particular,	   Putin	   has	   made	   a	   strong	   link	  
between	   economic	   and	   foreign	   policies.	  
This	   link	   was	   manifest	   in	   the	   2006	   and	  
2009	  Ukraine	  gas	  crises.	  	  
Russia’s	   strategy	   in	   the	  Southern	  Corridor	  
issue	  is	  based	  on	  two	  pillars.	  	  The	  first	  one	  
is	   to	   avoid	   cheaper	   Central	   Asian	   gas	  
accessing	   Europe	   to	   protect	   the	   virtual	  
Russian	  monopoly	  in	  the	  European	  market	  
and	   its	   near	   monopoly	   as	   sole	   buyer	   of	  
Central	   Asian	   gas.	   The	   second	   one	   is	  
reducing	  Russia’s	   dependence	  on	  Ukraine	  
as	  main	  gas	  transit	  country	  by	  promoting	  a	  
new	  reliable	  transit	  country:	  Turkey.	  	  That	  
is	   why	   besides	   the	   current	   pipeline	  
infrastructure,	   which	   is	   not	   yet	   at	   full	  
capacity,	   Russia	   is	   promoting	   two	  
concurrent	   pipeline	   projects	   to	   frustrate	  
European	   southern	   corridor	   initiatives:	  
Blue	  Stream	  II	  and	  South	  Stream.	  	  
The	   Blue	   Stream	   II	   gas	  
pipeline	   project,	   on	   the	  
other	   hand,	   is	   an	   expan-­‐
sion	  of	   the	  Blue	  Stream	  I.	  
Inaugurated	   in	   2003,	   it	  
carries	  Russian	  gas	  across	  
the	  Black	  Sea	  to	  Turkey	  by	  
the	   Samsun-­‐Ceyhan	   link	  
and	   by	   branch	   to	   South	  
East	   Europe.	   Blue	   Stre-­‐
am	  II	   pipeline’s	   expected	  
transport	   capacity	   is	   16	  
bcm	   per	   year,	   and	   its	   shareholders	   are	  
Gazprom,	   Blue	   Stream	   Pipeline	   B.V.	   and	  
BOTAŞ.	  	  	  
South	  Stream	  is	  a	  gas	  pipeline	  project	  that	  
aims	   to	   bring	   Russian	   gas	   to	   Austria	   in	  
Europe	   via	   the	   Black	   Sea,	   Bulgaria	   and	  
Hungary.	   South	   Stream	   pipeline’s	   expec-­‐
ted	  transport	  capacity	  is	  63	  bcm	  per	  year.	  
Gazprom	   and	   ENI	   are	   equal	   shareholders	  
of	   the	   operator	   company	   South	   Stream	  
AG.	  	  
Until	   September	   2011,	   there	   was	   a	  
bipolarization	   in	   the	   Eurasian	   energy	  
diplomacy	  between	  Russia	  and	  EU.	  Turkish	  
signatures	   were	   present	   in	   projects	   of	  
both	   sides.	   But	   the	   game	   changed	   after	  
the	  shareholders	  of	  the	  main	  gas	  fields	  of	  
In	  fact,	  Nabucco,	  TAP	  or	  ITGI	  
projects	  are	  not	  Turkey’s	  only	  
options	  to	  fulfill	  its	  ambitions	  to	  
become	  an	  energy	  bridge:	  the	  
Game	  also	  has	  other	  players.	  
First	  among	  these	  is	  Russia,	  who	  
supports	  South	  Stream	  and	  Blue	  
Stream	  II	  pipeline	  projects	  in	  
response	  to	  pipeline	  projects	  
backed	  by	  the	  EU.	  



























the	   Caspian	   zone,	   BP	   and	   SOCAR,	  
promoted	  their	  own	  gas	  transit	  projects.	  	  
Suppliers’	  Projects:	  SEEP	  and	  TANAP	  
The	  fist	  shocking	  news	  of	  the	  Eurasian	  gas	  
market	   arrived	   on	   September	   27,	   2011,	  
when	  BP,	   the	  operating	  company	  and	  the	  
leader	   of	   Shah	   Deniz	   II	   gas	   field	   consor-­‐
tium,	  announced	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  South	  
East	   Europe	   Pipeline	   (SEEP).	   The	   Shah	  
Deniz	  II	  gas	  field	  is	  the	  main	  supply	  source	  
of	   the	   Southern	   Energy	   Corridor.	   The	  
South-­‐East	  Europe	  Pipeline	  (SEEP)	  challen-­‐
ges	   in	   varying	   degrees	   the	   three	   pre-­‐
existing	   pipeline	   projects:	   Nabucco	   (from	  
eastern	   Turkey	   to	   Vienna),	   the	   ITGI	   and	  
TAP	  (also	  originating	  in	  Turkey).	  	  
SEEP	   would	   use	   existing	   pipelines	   and	  
interconnectors	   for	   about	   two	   thirds	   of	  
the	   3,800	   kilometer	   route	   from	   Central	  
Anatolia	   to	   Central	   Europe.	   It	   would	  
require	  laying	  only	  some	  1,300	  kilometers	  
of	  new	  pipelines	  with	  a	  capacity	  of	  10	  bcm	  
per	  year	  and	  a	  cost	  of	  14	  billion	  Euros.	   In	  
comparison	   to	  Nabucco	   (3,800	  kilometers	  
in	  length,	  at	  31	  bcm	  annual	  capacity),	  BP’s	  
proposal	   is	   a	   smaller	   and	   cheaper	   trans-­‐
porttation	  solution	  for	  Shah	  Deniz	  gas.	  	  
Two	  months	  later,	  on	  December	  26,	  2011,	  
Azerbaijan,	   the	  main	   supply	   country,	   and	  
Turkey,	   the	   main	   transit	   country,	   signed	  
the	   memorandum	   for	   Trans-­‐Anatolian	  
Pipeline	   (TANAP).	   TANAP	   is	   an	   Azeri-­‐Tur-­‐
kish	   joint	   gas	   pipeline	   project	   with	   capa-­‐
city	   at	   30	  bcm	   to	  be	  operational	   in	  2017.	  
The	   objective	   of	   TANAP	   is	   to	   transit	  
Caspian	  gas	  sources	  to	  European	  markets	  
The	  Turkish	   government	   as	  well	   as	   public	  
and	   private	   energy	   companies	   have	   links	  
to	   the	  above	   stated	   five	  projects.	   TANAP,	  
Nabucco,	   ITGI,	   Blue	   Stream	   II	   and	   South	  
Stream	   and	   are	   missing	   only	   in	   two	   of	  
them:	  SEEP	  and	  TAP.	  	  
The	   multilateral	   engagements	   of	   Turkish	  
actors	   reveal	   questions	   about	   Turkey’s	  
political	   relevance	   and	   its	   standing	   in	   the	  
international	   competition	   for	   dominance	  
of	   pipeline	   projects	   harnessing	   Caspian	  
and	   Middle	   Eastern	   energy	   sources.	   The	  
elucidation	   of	   competing	   agendas	   in	  
Turkish	   energy	   policy	   requires	   a	   conside-­‐
ration	  of	  the	  forces	  driving	  Turkish	  energy	  
policy.	  	  
Driving	   Forces	   behind	   Turkey’s	  
Energy	  Policy	  	  
The	   ultimate	   question	   concerning	   Turkish	  
energy	   policy	   for	   the	   EU,	  which	   attempts	  
to	   counterbalance	   the	   Russian	   energy	  
monopoly,	  is	  whether	  Turkey	  competes	  or	  
cooperates	   with	   Russia	   in	   the	   world	  
energy	  market.	   In	   fact,	   it	  does	  both.	  Four	  
often	   conflicting	   agendas	   driving	   Turkish	  
energy	  policy	  contribute	  to	  understanding	  
this	  état	  de	  fait:	  full	  EU	  membership,	  trade	  
with	  Russia,	  political	  and	  economic	  leader-­‐
ship	   of	   the	   Middle	   East	   region,	   and	   the	  
growing	   power	   of	   the	   private	   energy	  
companies.	  	  
One	   of	   the	   most	   obvious	   drivers	   is	  
Turkey’s	   candidacy	   for	   full	   EU	   member-­‐
ship.	   In	  this	   frame	  if	  Turkey	   is	  required	  to	  
be	  seen	  as	  an	  ally	  of	  the	  EU,	  it	  will	  need	  to	  
contribute	   to	   the	   realization	   of	   the	   EU	  
backed-­‐projects	   Nabucco,	   ITGI	   or	   TAP	   of	  
the	  Southern	  Energy	  Corridor.	  This	  Energy	  
Corridor	   would	   provide	   Europe	   with	  
access	   to	   Caspian	   gas	   without	   passing	  
through	  Russia.	  	  
A	  second	  driver	  is	  that	  Russia	  is	  a	  strategic	  
neighbor	   for	   Turkey	   and	   its	   number	   one	  
trading	   partner.	   	   Turkey’s	   promotion	   of	  
alternative	   corridors	   bypassing	   Russia	  
would	   undermine	   the	   energy	   monopoly	  
power	   of	   the	   Russian	   state	   energy	  
companies	  in	  the	  Caspian	  Region.	  	  
A	  third	  driver	  emerges	  from	  Turkey’s	  new	  
foreign	   policy:	   Turkey’s	   ambition	   to	  
assume	  political	   and	  economic	   leadership	  



























in	  Central	  Asia	  and	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  If	  we	  
consider	   alternatively	   Iranian	   or	   Iraqi	   gas	  
as	   supply	   resources	   for	   the	   Southern	  
Energy	   Corridor,	   Turkey	   has	   the	   potential	  
to	   become	   an	   independent	  moderator	   in	  
energy	  deals	  between	  west	  and	  east.	  
The	   final	   driving	   force	   is	   the	   growing	  
power	  of	  private	  energy	   companies.	   Even	  
though	   they	   only	   gained	   influence	   after	  
2001	  with	  the	  liberalization	  of	  the	  Turkish	  
energy	   market,	   some	   of	   these	   energy	  
companies	  and	  contractors	  have	  acquired	  
significant	  strategic	  po-­‐wer.	  
The	   impact	   of	   this	   power	  
will	   be	   soon	  affect	  external	  
energy	   policy,	   as	   Russian	  
investors	   are	   showing	   inte-­‐
rest	   in	   securing	   stakes	   in	  
these	   emerging	   Turkish	  
energy	   companies.	   	   In	   fact,	  
the	  liberalization	  of	  the	  Tur-­‐
kish	   energy	   market,	   which	  
was	   introduced	   to	   conform	  with	  EU	   stan-­‐
dards,	   ironically	   serves	   the	   interests	   of	  
Russian	  investors.	  	  
For	   Turkey,	   the	   success	   and	   sustainability	  
of	  a	  project	  is	  related	  to	  the	  equilibrium	  of	  
these	   four	   main	   driving	   forces	   of	   Turkish	  
energy	  policy.	  
Four	   Scenarios	   for	   Turkish	   Energy	  
Policy	  
Until	  the	  recent	  changes	  that	  took	  place	  in	  
September	   2011,	   Turkey	   was	   bound	   to	  
choose	   between	   three	   alternative	   of	  
scenarios:	   supporting	   European	   projects,	  
Russian	  projects,	  or	  both.	  	  
In	  the	  first	  scenario,	  Turkey	  would	  opt	  only	  
for	   Nabucco	   or	   any	   other	   EU-­‐backed	  
projects	   and	   would	   compete	   with	   Russia	  
by	  rejecting	  Gazprom’s	  pipeline	  proposals.	  
In	   this	   case,	   Turkey	   would	   sign	   the	  
European	   Energy	   Charter	   Treaty.	   Turkey	  
would	   thus	   jeopardize	  economic	   relations	  
with	   its	   most	   important	   trading	   partner	  
for	   exports,	   Russia,	   and	   their	   additional	  
agreements	   regarding	   nuclear	   energy	  
cooperation	  or	  visa-­‐free	  travel	  would	  also	  
be	  hampered.	  	  
Yet	   Turkey	   did	   not	   get	   what	   it	   has	  
demanded	   for	   the	   Intergovernmental	  
Agreement	   of	   Nabucco	   pipeline,	   15%	   of	  
the	   pipeline’s	   gas	   for	   domestic	   use	  
acquired	   and	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   Energy	  
Chapter	   in	   the	   EU	   accession	   process.	  
Official	   statements	   like	   that	   of	   former	  
European	   Commissioner	  
for	   Energy	   Andris	   Piebalgs	  
also	   indicate	   that	   it	   is	   not	  
realistic	   to	   expect	   any	  
more	   political	   gain	   for	  
Turkey	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
exclusive	   commitment	   to	  
EU	   pipeline	   projects:	  
“Turkey-­‐EU	   energy	   coope-­‐
ration	   is	   a	   process	   that…	  
has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  EU	  accession	  –	  
the	   one	   does	   not	   pre-­‐judge	   the	   other	   or	  
vice	   versa…	   They	   both	   stem	   from	   the	  
under-­‐standing	  that	  further	  cooperation	  is	  
needed	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   Turkey	   in	   a	  
number	  of	  fields.”1	  In	  addition	  to	  harming	  
its	   relations	   with	   Russia,	   by	   committing	  
exclusively	   to	  EU-­‐backed	  pipeline	  projects	  
Turkey	  will	  not	  necessarily	   improve	   its	  EU	  
accession	  process.	  	  
In	   the	   second	   scenario,	   Turkey	   would	  
cooperate	   with	   Russia	   and	   give	   exclusive	  
support	   to	   the	   South	   Stream	   pipeline	  
project.	   As	   a	   result,	   Turkey	   would	  
withdraw	   its	   signature	   from	   the	   Interna-­‐
tional	  Governmental	  Agreement	  on	  Nabu-­‐
cco,	   the	   Russian	   energy	  monopoly	   would	  
be	   strengthened,	   and	   Turkey-­‐Russia	   eco-­‐
nomic	   and	   political	   relations	   would	   be	  
reinforced.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  price	  of	  
Russian	   gas	   would	   become	  more	   compe-­‐
titive	   for	   Turkey,	   and	   Turkey’s	   energy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Speech	  delivered	  at	  the	  conference	  “Turkey	  and	  
the	  EU,”	  Istanbul,	  5	  June	  2007.	  	  
In	  fact,	  the	  liberalization	  of	  
the	  Turkish	  energy	  market,	  
which	  was	  introduced	  to	  
conform	  with	  EU	  standards,	  
ironically	  serves	  the	  
interests	  of	  Russian	  
investors.	  



























market	   would	   fall	   under	   significant	   Rus-­‐
sian	  control.	  On	  the	  European	  side,	  the	  EU	  
would	   equivocate	   on	   Turkey’s	   accession	  
talks.	   Despite	   the	   favorable	   conditions	   of	  
negotiations,	   the	   EU	   accession	   process	  
would	   continue	   on	   its	   own	   rhythm	  
independent	   of	   energy	   cooperation.	   	   The	  
Energy	  Chapter	  would	   remain	  suspended,	  
because	   this	   blockage	   is	   not	   related	   to	  
energy	  policy	   issues.	  Turkey	  would	  refrain	  
from	   signing	   the	   Energy	   Charter	   Treaty,	  
jeopardizing	   energy	   interconnectivity	   in	  
Europe.	   In	   addition	   to	   unstable	   depen-­‐
dency	   relations	   between	   East	   European	  
countries	   and	   Ukraine,	   Greece,	   Bulgaria,	  
Romania	   and	   Italy	   would	   also	   become	  
dependent	   on	   Turkey,	   an	   energy	   transit	  
country	   that	   does	   not	   have	   strengthened	  
political	   relations	   with	   the	   EU.	   The	   EU’s	  
energy	   security	   would	   thus	   remain	  
vulnerable,	   and	   its	   presence	   in	   the	   Black	  
Sea	  weakened.	  	  
In	   the	   third	   scenario,	   Turkey	  would	   show	  
stoic	   resignation	   towards	   this	   rivalry	   and	  
avoid	  making	   boldly	   explicit	   claims	   about	  
either	  project.	  It	  would	  lay	  the	  ground	  for	  
both	   and	   wait	   before	   lending	   its	   full	  
support	   to	   the	   project	   which	   would	   be	  
implemented	   first.	   In	   this	   frame,	   Turkey	  
would	  sign	  agreements	  to	  allow	  use	  of	   its	  
territories	   for	   either	   pipeline.	   Conversely	  
to	   what	   is	   expected	   under	   the	   other	  
scenarios,	   neither	   relations	   with	   Russia	  
nor	   relations	   with	   the	   EU	   would	   deterio-­‐
rate.	   Both	   would	   maintain	   smooth	  
economic	   and	   political	   relations	   with	  
Turkey	   and	   make	   efforts	   to	   avoid	  
obstacles	  for	  their	  pipeline	  projects.	  	  
Since	   September	   2011,	   Turkey’s	   energy	  
policy	   actions	   most	   resembled	   this	   third	  
scenario.	   	   Yet	   the	  emergence	  of	   the	  SEEP	  
and	   TANAP	   projects	   created	   the	  
opportunity	  for	  a	  fourth	  scenario,	  in	  which	  
Turkey	   has	   the	   opportunity	   to	   cooperate	  
only	   with	   operators	   of	   the	   sources,	   an	  
option	   that	   allows	   all	   shareholders	   to	  
maximize	   their	   commercial	   profits	   thanks	  
to	  less	  costly	  investment	  and	  cheaper	  gas.	  
The	   Shah	   Deniz	   II	   Consortium’s	   announ-­‐
cement	   to	   undertake	   exclusive	   negotia-­‐
tions	  with	  TAP	  and	  BP’s	  acknowledgement	  
that	   it	   is	   only	   considering	   Nabucco	   and	  
SEEP	   means	   that	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   Shah	  
Deniz	  Consortium	  did	  not	  give	  any	  priority	  
to	   the	   TANAP	   Azeri–Turkey	   joint	   project.	  
As	  a	   result,	   the	   fourth	   scenario	  has	  beco-­‐
me	  clearer.	  
BP,	   as	   the	   operator	   of	   the	   Shah	   Deniz	   II	  
gas	   field,	   would	   opt	   for	   his	   own	   project	  
SEEP	   to	   bring	   gas	   from	   Azerbaijan	   to	  
Western	  border	  of	  Turkey.	   	  This	  would	  be	  
the	   first	   leg	   of	   Southern	   Energy	   Corridor.	  	  
The	   second	   leg	   concerns	   circulation	  
among	  Europe.	  Considering	  the	  announce-­‐
ments	   of	   February	   2012,	   TAP	   would	  
complete	   a	   first	   pillar	   of	   this	   second	   leg	  
running	   in	   southern	   Europe,	   from	  Greece	  
to	   Italy.	   Now,	   the	   question	   is	   whether	  
Europe	   needs	   a	   second	   pillar	   for	   gas	  
transport	   in	   Northern	   Europe	   to	   Baum-­‐
garten	  hub	  in	  Austria.	  If	  the	  need	  persists,	  
would	  Nabucco	  meet	  this	  need?	  	  
Concerning	   Turkey’s	   standing,	   if	   Turkey	  
opts	   for	   SEEP,	   the	   Shah	   Deniz	   II	   consor-­‐
tium	   would	   bring	   gas	   to	   the	   western	  
border	   of	   Turkey,	   with	   Turkey	   earning	  
transit	   fees	   and	   related	   gas	   shares.	   The	  
Consortium	  would	  then	  sell	  this	  gas	  on	  its	  
own	   range.	   The	  Nabucco	   pipeline	   project	  
would	  be	  revised	  to	  start	  at	  the	  Bulgarian	  
border.	   As	   the	   length	   is	   reduced,	   the	  
consortium	   would	   overcome	   the	   funding	  
barrier,	   and	   the	   project	   would	   be	  
achieved.	  All	  the	  shareholders	  of	  Nabucco,	  
including	   Turkey,	   would	   maximize	   the	  
return	   on	   their	   investment.	   Gazprom	  
would	  build	  South	  Stream	  and	  sell	  Russian	  
gas	  to	  Southern	  Europe.	  The	  two	  different	  
gas	  supply	  roads,	  SEEP	  and	  South	  Stream,	  
would	   meet	   with	   the	   new	   Nabucco	  
pipeline	   starting	   at	   Bulgarian	   border.	  
Concurrence	   between	   the	   South	   Stream	  



























and	   SEEP	  would	   also	   regulate	   gas	  market	  
to	  the	  benefit	  of	  European	  consumers.	  	  
Conclusion	  
All	  in	  all,	  Turkish	  standing	  in	  Eurasian	  ener-­‐
gy	   diplomacy	   must	   be	   analyzed	   in	   the	  
context	   of	   competing	   energy	   transit	   pro-­‐
jects:	   Nabucco,	   ITGI,	   TAP,	   South	   Stream,	  
Blue	   Stream	   II,	   TANAP	   and	   SEEP.	   If	   the	  
ultimate	   question	   of	   Eurasian	   energy	  
market	   is	   which	   of	   these	   projects	   will	   be	  
built,	   for	   sustainability	   of	   regional	   peace	  
the	   answer	   should	   be	   built	   on	   political	  
consensus	   and	   multi-­‐partite	   equilibrium	  
between	   the	  main	   players:	   the	   suppliers,	  
Russia,	   Azerbaijan;	   the	   consumers,	   Euro-­‐
pean	   countries;	   and	   the	   transiting	   coun-­‐
tries,	  Ukraine	  and	  Turkey.	  Bipolarization	  in	  
energy	  diplomacy	  blocks	   investments	   and	  
brings	   about	   deadlock	   in	   economic	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